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The dome of the U.S. Capitol, home 
and symbol of Congress, in Washington, 
D.C. On November 2, the seats of 
37 Senators and all of the 435 
Representatives were up for election. 
Republicans regained a majority in 
the House. They also won some seats 
in the Senate, but not enough for a 
majority (photo: personal collection 
of Maarten Katsman)
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The Dutch mission  
in Uruzgan1 
In the past, military defeat has led to resignations of Ministers of Defence. But in February this year, it was 
the first time a ruling party, the Social Democrats (PvdA), brought down the coalition government, as protest 
against extending a military mission. This historical moment even inspired the Taliban to congratulate the Social 
Democrats: ‘we congratulate the Dutch for this courageous and independent decision,’2 said Taliban spokesman 
Qari Yusuf Ahmadi. The Taliban hope other countries will follow the Dutch example. After four years of intensive 
commitment to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the mission of around 2,000 Dutch soldiers 
in the Afghan province Uruzgan ended. On August 1, the last troops of Taskforce Uruzgan (TFU) transferred 
command to American forces.
Between 2006 and 2010 The Netherlands were active as lead nation 
in Uruzgan. Thousands of soldiers and dozens of civilian personnel 
contributed signiﬁcantly to ISAF. Initially, rotations of 1,200 to 
1,400 soldiers would serve in Uruzgan, a ﬁgure that rose to almost 
2,000. The Dutch suffered 24 fatal casualties.
What exactly did the Dutch troops do in Uruzgan? How was the 
mission presented, which discussions were held over deﬁnitions 
and terminology? An what happened during these four years?  
Only rarely did military deployment lead to such intense discussion 
as did TFU, in the media as well as in politics. The Netherlands 
invested heavily in this operation. Many more soldiers were  
deployed than in previous years, and Dutch soldiers did not  
engage in combat so often since the Korean War.
This article analyses the recent history of the Dutch mission in 
Uruzgan, both the political-strategic and the operational and tactical 
aspects. First, the focus lies on the political discussion and the nature 
of the mission. Second, some actual TFU operations will be examined.
The mission: decision to deploy
Deploying the armed forces is not the prerogative of the admin-
istration alone. Support of Parliament is required. The process 
of ‘framing’ a foreign crisis as a national security issue or as an 
obligation as a respectable ally is therefore the ﬁrst political step 
to persuade Parliament. Military expert Frank Kitson observed this 
as early as 1977:
“The ﬁrst thing that must be apparent when contemplating  
the sort of action which a government facing insurgency 
should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely 
military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military 
activity.”3 
This quote relates to executing counterinsurgency (COIN) missions  
on the operational and tactical level, but it also applies to the 
national level of decision-making and communication process. 
Also the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, published in 
2010, recognised this issue: “a COIN strategy is only as good as 
the political plan at its heart.”4 Government ofﬁcials need a clear 
political plan and accompanying communication strategy, both for 
themselves and for Parliament.
How did that go in the Netherlands? From the beginning, TFU 
was part of the ISAF operation aimed at combating international 
terrorism and stabilising the Afghan region. That was also how 
the Dutch participation was presented. On 22 December 2005, in 
an article-100 declaration, the Dutch government Ministers Henk 
Kamp (Defence), Ben Bot (Foreign Affairs) and Agnes van Ardenne 
Political and 
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U.S. Navy Seabees erect an exterior wall for a Southwest Asian Hut on Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan. The Dutch mission in Uruzgan was mista-
kenly viewed as just a ‘reconstruction’ mission (photo: U.S. Navy/Vuong Ta)
Debate
(Development Cooperation) informed the Second Chamber (Dutch 
House of Representatives) of the mission in Uruzgan. The aim of 
the mission, described in the declaration, was in accordance with 
the ISAF mandate. The Netherlands were thus not ofﬁcially at war; 
Article 96 of the Constitution did not come into effect. It was in 
the ﬁrst place a question of promoting good governance, setting 
up efﬁcient police and armed forces and assisting in the build-
ing of a constitutional state, as well as carrying out CIMIC and 
reconstruction activities.
The linkage between bringing stability, security and reconstruction 
was recognised early by the three Ministers. In a letter sent to the 
Second Chamber on 22 December 2005, they wrote:
‘The stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan, especially 
in the south, where the Taliban has its origin, is of the great-
est importance for the promotion of international order and 
the ﬁght against international terrorism which also threatens 
Europe. In view of that importance the government considers 
the risks [of the mission] acceptable.’5
The Ministers also stated that without a certain level of security, 
economic reconstruction could not start. This observation was in 
line with the prevailing views on crisis management that security 
and stability are the pre-conditions for lasting development. 
In February 2006 the Second Chamber decided that Dutch soldiers 
should be sent under the ﬂag of the TFU to Uruzgan province in 
the south of Afghanistan. The plan was that the Dutch troops 
would take over two bases in Uruzgan. From there they would 
gradually extend their inﬂuence and in so doing promote security 
and stability in the province. This would consequently facilitate 
the reconstruction to be carried out preferably in collaboration 
with Afghan and international organisations.
The mission: the debate
Immediately after the February decision a discussion about the 
nature of the mission took off, which was adopted and drama-
tised in the media. In the course of a general consultation in 
the Second Chamber on 22 February 2006, member Farah Karimi 
(Groenlinks; Green Party), for example, deﬁned the Dutch deploy-
ment as a ‘combat mission,’ even before the ﬁrst TFU rotation 
became operational. The term ‘combat mission’ was then taken up 
by other opposition parties (the SP and later also by D66 and the 
PVV), heralding the beginning of a long discussion over the mis-
sion – a discussion which centred on the (supposed) opposition 
between the terms ‘reconstruction mission’ and ‘combat mission.’
Critics in Parliament were mostly afraid the Dutch reconstruction 
activities would overlap with the American combat operations 
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carried out under Operation Enduring Freedom. Dutch soldiers 
were supposed to build schools, promote women’s emancipation 
and invest in local government – and rather not ﬁght too much. 
Conservative parties denounced this ‘soft’ approach en doubted 
the usefulness of one-sided humanitarian activities in a country  
so deeply divided and scourged by armed conﬂicts.
Ministers Bot and Van Middelkoop tried to turn the tide by point-
ing out that the government had never alleged it was a matter of 
such a simplistic opposition. But the harm was already done. Not 
only in public debate but also in the media the TFU was increas-
ingly discussed in terms of this opposition.
The armed forces themselves tried to avoid this narrowing of vision 
by making it clear that many options were open at the same time. 
On the question of whether it should be a combat mission or a re-
construction mission the commander of TFU-1, Colonel Theo Vleugels, 
replied: ‘We are going to do what is necessary and possible.’6 
Major-General Ton van Loon, commander of Regional Command-
South (RC-South) from 1 November 2006 to 1 May 2007, also avoided 
getting dragged into the discussion then being conducted in the 
Netherlands: ‘We must also be prepared, in certain places where we 
cannot construct, to ﬁght in order to achieve that security.’7 The 
commander of TFU-2, Colonel Hans van Griensven, commented: ‘The 
words “reconstruction mission” and “combat mission”, and their 
interpretation do not exist in our Defence Doctrine.’8 In the years 
immediately following, Defence tried to break out of this polarised 
discussion. On 5 October 2007 General Dick Berlijn, then Commander 
of the Armed Forces, let it be known that he was not at all happy 
with the term ‘reconstruction mission.’ Minister Van Middelkoop 
stressed that the mission in south Afghanistan should be character-
ised neither as a ‘reconstruction mission’ nor as a ‘combat mission.’
These nuances had little effect, however. The contradiction be-
tween combat and reconstruction remained forcefully in the public 
conceptualisation and debates. Why was there so little room and 
understanding for the nuances?
The mission as a COIN campaign
It is remarkable that Dutch government Ministers, both before 
and outside Parliament, avoided the use of the concept of COIN 
as much as they could. COIN is present in all ISAF documents, for 
example in the Tactical Directive of COM ISAF. But compared to 
debates in Great Britain, France or the U.S., COIN seems to have 
a negative connotation in the Netherlands. After all, COIN also 
stood for offensive, kinetic operations. Instead of COIN, the gov-
ernment introduced the ‘3D concept’: the trinity of Development, 
Diplomacy and Defence, which sounded much better than the mili-
taristic term ‘counterinsurgency,’ according to Dutch politicians. 
However, the Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV; Advisory 
Council on International Affairs) concluded that the 3D-approach 
only served to increase the confusion, since it was not backed by 
any doctrine and could be interpreted at liberty.9
Yet a uniform political description of the mission as a COIN opera-
tion would have been the best choice. Other descriptions raised the 
wrong expectations. COIN indicates that besides civil and adminis-
trative activities, combat is necessary as well. Reconstruction, how-
ever, suggests a population welcomes foreign units. The gap between 
expectations in the Netherlands and actual practice in Afghanistan 
thus widened. In 2006, 36 per cent of the population supported 
the mission, 26 per cent did not.10 In 2009, the ﬁgure opposing the 
mission rose to forty per cent, while the support dropped to 33 per 
cent.11 In 2009 only ten per cent of the population believed the 
mission in Afghanistan would help reduce the risk of terrorist attacks 
in the Netherlands – whereas this had exactly been the claim of the 
government ofﬁcials who wrote the decision to deploy.
Historian Christ Klep has convincingly argued that whenever a peace 
mission fails to turn out as outlined in advance, such a gap between 
image and reality (which is ultimately the result of unclear concep-
tual thinking and decision-making) can lead to enormous tensions 
and dramatic consequences. In other words: by clearly deﬁning 
the mission as a COIN operation, political and public support and 
knowledge can be mobilised to gain the necessary combination of 
administrative, military and humanitarian aspects of the mission. 
Furthermore, commanders in the ﬁeld won’t have to face constant 
scrutiny from a Second Chamber, which incorrectly believes military 
operations are not connected to humanitarian activities.
The confusion about the exact nature of the Dutch mission even ex-
isted within the military trade union: Wim van den Burg, the chair-
man of the military trade union in the Netherlands, publicly objected 
against prolongation of the mission with the argument that Dutch 
soldiers could not be asked to give their lives for a corrupt govern-
ment – signalling that he measured success of the mission against 
the level of democratisation in Afghanistan. However, democratisa-
tion was never explicitly formulated as a goal of the mission.
The AIV concluded in April 2009 that better communication was 
essential. Maintaining broad and vague concepts would not only 
keep the confusion and polarised discussion in place, but would 
also keep raising the wrong expectations at a time when demo-
cratic legitimacy and public-political support for a military mission 
were crucial. 
It was not only the Dutch government that failed to convince 
its population of the necessity of the mission in Uruzgan. Lord 
Robertson, NATO Secretary General from 1999 to 2004, signalled 
during a speech in March 2010 that the Alliance was ‘on the edge 
of a precipice’: 
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A U.S. Army soldier ﬁres a mortar round. Combat is an integral part of COIN operations, 
including the Dutch mission in Afghanistan (photo: U.S. Army/Joshua Grenier) 
“If these two robust allies [The Netherlands and Canada] and 
those who may be thinking of doing the same, and addition-
ally those who contribute less than they should, can all shy 
away from their obligation stemming from the decision taken 
unanimously in 1993, what is it other than a crisis?”12
This does not mean that ending TFU and the declining support 
in Europe for the war in Afghanistan could only be blamed on an 
inadequate communication strategy. There are sufﬁcient concrete 
political and military arguments to justify withdrawal. Participation 
in ISAF was and still is a political choice, rather than inescapable 
necessity. Still, the right display of the goal and nature of the 
mission and a clear and uniform presentation thereof to the people 
would have narrowed the gap between public expectations and 
military reality. This would have sobered down the political and 
sometimes heated debate about prolongation of the mission.
What then could the government have made clear? First of all that 
TFU would be in a COIN campaign from the very start in 2006. 
The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide deﬁnes COIN as the 
“blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to 
simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes.”13 
Military doctrine often uses the deﬁnition of the American Joint 
Publication 1-02: “counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, 
political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a 
government to defeat insurgency.”14 The common deﬁnition of the 
Dutch armed forces is similar to the one of Joint Publication 1-02.
Counterinsurgency is thus directed not primarily at the elimina-
tion of insurgents themselves (an enemy-centric approach), but 
at the security of the population (a population-centric approach). 
As Major-General Mart de Kruif, the Dutch commander of RC-South 
from November 2008 until November 2009, put it: ‘Yes, we shall 
kill evil-doers, but the centre of gravity [of our mission] lies in 
protecting the population.’15 The ﬁnal outcome of a successful
counterinsurgency campaign is a legitimate, sovereign government 
in the eyes of the population, that can ensure effective adminis-
tration and can independently reduce the insurgency to – or main-
tain it at – an acceptable level. In operations like the mission in 
Afghanistan, there was a clear hierarchy of aims: the political goal 
stood ﬁrst and foremost, while the approach, the way in which 
the diplomatic, military, and development means are deployed, is 
secondary to this primary goal – thus this completely matched the 
deﬁnition of a COIN operation.
Moreover, the government could have expressed there was no such 
thing as a typical Dutch approach in the south of Afghanistan. 
Dutch strategy was not ‘softer’ or more focused on dialogue than 
the strategy of other states. It was a classic COIN approach, derived 
from the so-called ‘inkspot approach,’ separated in phases of ‘shape-
clear-hold-build,’ in accordance with Field Manual 3-24. The ‘inkspot’ 
strategy was already discussed by 
Sir Robert Thompson in his stand-
ard work Defeating Communist 
Insurgency in 1966. This becomes 
clear when actual practice of the 
mission is examined, espe-
cially the large operations in the 
Baluchi Valley in the heart of 
Uruzgan, some twenty kilometres 
north of Tarin Kowt. 
Baluchi Valley
The Baluchi valley was already a stronghold of the Taliban before 
the arrival of the Dutch and Australian military. In July 2006 the 
Dutch commandos took part in Operation Perth, an ISAF operation 
led by the Australian Special Operations Task Group. The main aim of 
Operation Perth was to reduce the threat for Tarin Kowt and its sur-
rounding area by driving Taliban ﬁghters out of the Baluchi valley. 
This was to prevent any threat arising to the construction of the 
Dutch camp in Tarin Kowt. The operation was successful, with 200 to 
300 enemy combatants being killed and the rest of the enemy ﬂee-
ing the area. As a result of the operation the Baluchi pass was for 
the ﬁrst time accessible for ISAF troops and freedom of movement 
was created in the valley around Chora, Surkh Murgab, and Khurma.
However, after a brief period following this operation the val-
ley was once again full of insurgents. As Major Joris correctly 
observed: ‘the enemy is ﬂuid.’ Without a follow-up (hold), a sweep 
(clearing) operation has only a short-term effect. Driving out 
insurgents without the sufﬁcient capacity – either on our part  
or that of the Afghan forces – to hold the area only leads to the 
territory falling into the hands of the enemy once more. It is  
then no more than a superﬁcial area sweep. Colonel Theo Vleugels,  
the commander of TFU-1 said: ‘It’s like water: if you don’t stay  
it streams back.’16 This was an important lesson.
During Operation Perth the units did not get round to the second 
stage (the hold-phase), in which the emphasis falls on various 
non-kinetic efforts to win over the population. That was not their 
objective, as explained earlier. However, as a direct consequence 
of the operation ceasing after the ‘clear’ stage, the ISAF troops, 
and therefore also the TFU, had to take control of the region all 
over again a year after the initiation of Operation Perth. Only after 
two more operations, Spin Ghar and Tura Ghar, did they learn the 
lesson of securing and holding the area on a 24/7, permanent 
presence base, not only building strongholds at the entrances of 
the valley, but also establishing posts within the valley itself. For 
an analysis of the two other operations in the Baluchi-Valley, see 
George Dimitriu and Beatrice de Graaf, ‘The Dutch COIN approach: 
three years in Uruzgan, 2006-2009.’1
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Conclusion
The operations in the Baluchi valley demonstrated the TFU was 
indeed conducting a classical COIN-mission. TFU did draw that 
conclusion itself, learned from each previous operation and recog-
nised that liberating an area without following up by establishing 
a permanent presence delivered only short-term results. At this 
point, in fact, a permanent presence in an area became the basis 
of the planning and execution of operations. Operations should be 
directly followed by reconstruction activities as well as training of 
native armed forces and/or security personnel.
Al least as important, is the lesson that permanent presence is 
only possible when the political leadership and Parliament are 
familiar with what exactly a COIN operation is. Providing a few 
hundred troops for a quick sweep of an area and then expecting 
reconstruction to begin, appears a too simple version of reality. 
As things stood, permanent protection of the local population by 
Dutch forces was necessary, but with the current military capaci-
ties in mind, often an almost overstretching assignment. That 
does not mean success is impossible, but only in reach when a 
strong military presence is sustained over a longer period in a 
speciﬁc area. When political support is minimal from the start, 
when missions are presented as just ‘reconstruction’ or ‘training,’ 
the military nature of operations in a situation of permanent guer-
rilla will be ignored – and these operations will thus not achieve 
the overall goal of the mission: securing an area, protecting the 
population and ‘holding’ it over a longer period of time.
The most important lesson that can be drawn from ‘Uruzgan’ is 
therefore that the nature of COIN operations – especially the value 
of the ‘hold’-stage – should not only be trained in all levels of the 
armed forces, but should also be explained better to politicians 
and the public. Why should Dutch soldiers deploy in far and in-
hospitable lands, what exactly is the national security issue? And 
if decided to deploy: what does deployment mean in a situation 
where warlords and guerrillas operate among civilians? What does 
24/7 presence actually mean? How many troops are needed, for 
how much time? How much combat is acceptable? How long will  
it take before actual reconstruction can take off?
These questions have been answered too fast, simplistic and 
optimistic in the short history of Dutch deployment in Uruzgan. 
Nice, but rather vague metaphors and all-inclusive ‘3D approaches’ 
led to partisan political games, but did no justice to the military 
necessity of a speciﬁc execution and sufﬁcient supervision of the 
chosen COIN strategy. They also did not create the support and 
understanding necessary to meet the requirements (like sufﬁcient 
numbers of troops with a mandate for combat) needed for complex 
COIN operations. In short: when the Netherlands would like to 
keep expeditionary capabilities, it will not only require training 
of soldiers on the ground, but also statesmanship and clarity at 
the political leadership about the nature of the mission and the 
interests at stake.
Dr. Beatrice de Graaf is Associate Professor at the 
Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC) of  
the University of Leiden/Campus The Hague.
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